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SYBIL JACK* 
The present Western image of the pirate has been reduced to the 
level of the child's fancy dress party: the colourful, barefooted, 
sword-waving, eye-patch adorned child can shout and leap 
about without inspiring more than mock terror. This is a recent 
phenomenon. Growing European national power in the nineteenth 
century which eliminated piracy in Atlantic waters limited the 
pirates' power to scare. Pirates became fictional characters in the 
childhood stories of Stevenson with Long John Silver defeated in 
Treasure Island, Captain Hook in J. M. Barrie's play afraid of a 
crocodile, or more gently still, the Pirates of Penzance who could 
not rob an orphan. 
Elsewhere the pirate still instils terror. The image of the pirate as 
the ultimate threat to civilisation is based on fear. Pillage, robbery, 
cruelty, such are the percei ved acti vities of pirates but above all 
their hand is against everyone, they observe no law. Pirates through 
the ages have inspired fear in those on whom they prey. Whatever 
rights individuals may hope to have, in goods or in their own bodies, 
are set aside by the unrestrained power possessed by the spoilers. 
Mollat defined piracy as 'une action elementaire, sans caractere 
institutionnel que s'exerce contre n'importe quel Mtiment de 
commerce; eUe n'invoque aucune autre justification que la force et 
ne rend de compte a aucune autorite.'l A dictionary definition is of 
a ' "savage" form of life-those who set out to make war against 
both the friends and the enemies of the prince who should be their 
own lawful authority-so those who separate themselves from lawful 
government. They have been condemned by those with recognised 
legitimate authority through the ages'. 
Neither definition is wholly satisfactory, comprehensive or 
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absolutely accurate. The dictionary explicitly, and Mollat implicitly, 
assume that everyone must be subject to a lawful authority or prince 
and that there is no other authority. We should be wary of such 
definitions produced by authorities whose dominance of the discourse 
is turned to their own advantage. The usual aim of a state to final 
and absolute authority is more easily achieved on land than on sea. 
Some forms of piracy can hardl y be denied an institutional character; 
the pirate fleets had to have some form of internal order and 
discipline; the nature of universally recognised legitimate authority 
at sea is less self-evident than might be desirable. 
What constitutes piracy, moreover, is affected by one's viewpoint. 
Not all ships sailing in pursuit of prizes are pirates. There is an 
irregular verb which runs: they are pirates, you are a privateer, I am 
a legitimate authority. In theory, the distinction between a naval 
officer, a privateer and a pirate is clear-cut. In practice, in certain 
periods an individual might well be each in tum and sometimes all 
three at once. Drake is only the best known example of such a 
phenomenon. 
The theory, then, is that privateers were recognised by public 
authorities, and represented reprisal in a legalised and authorised 
form against presumed enemies. Privateers acted under government 
authority, the rules of admiralty courts and the law of the sea. They 
possessed letters of marque which authorised them to take enemy 
shipping in retaliation for alleged damage done to the kingdom's 
ships. Such prizes had to be taken with all their papers into a lawful 
port and reported for judgement. The crew, if the prize were judged 
lawful, then received part of the profits, which were divided in fixed 
proportions between the crew and the state.2 Pirates on the other 
hand retained as little as possible of the evidence relating to their 
prize. They deliberately destroyed the papers on board captured 
ships-charter parties, safe conducts, certificates and so on, and 
either drowned the masters and factors and those mariners who would 
not join them or put them ashore on islands or elsewhere to survive 
as best they could. 
Privateering was a popular fall-back position for states which 
could not afford a sufficiently large navy, or even a navy at all. The 
'guerre de course' as it was called could be an effective economic 
war of attrition. It was commonly used by both Christians and 
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Muslims in the Mecliterranean although the rules of privateering 
did not hold between Muslim and Christian. Those whom the West 
called Barbary pirates were actually corsairs, recognising as their 
masters the rulers of Algiers, Tunis and elsewhere. 'This was little 
comfort to the Christians who fell foul of them, since international 
treaties between Christian and Turk were more limited than those 
between Christian nations.3 While growing navies made privateering 
less necessary, shortage of funds led Louis XIV to resort to it in 
1697 when the pri vateers pouring out of Dunkirk took thousands of 
English merchant ShipS.4 In response, privateers from the Channel 
Islands and elsewhere took thousands of French ships. There was 
a pool of willing investors in these activities.5 
Privateering offered considerable advantages over piracy 
especially when the possibility of co-operation with legitimate 
merchants was attractive. At such times the distinction between the 
merchant, the privateer and the pirate might be virtually fictional. In 
wartime a total embargo on trade between clifferent countries led to 
a desperate shortage of certain goods in one country and a disastrous 
build up of inventory in another. Bargains might then be struck 
between 'merchants' on the one hand and 'pirates' on the other 
whereby the pirates (or privateers) seized the merchants' ship and 
goods-for a price agreed with the merchants-and sold them as 
prize where they were needed. 'This was effectively a safer way of 
running contraband. Buccaneers were a more transitory type, half 
way between pirate and privateer; they refrained from attacking 
ships of their own nation, but did not hold valid letters of marque. 
Piracy pure and simple, however, has always been with us. It 
is amorphous and the particular shape it takes from age to age is 
influenced by circumstances but every ocean and sea in every age 
has had its share of pirates. There are pirates today, infesting the 
South China seas and the waters around Hong Kong.6 There were 
pirates in Homer-sea raiders who found their booty ashore. There 
was piracy in the Indian Ocean in the third century B.C., when the 
superintendent of the emperor's ships was told to suppress it. There 
are frequent references in later Indian accounts of shipping going 
eastward to 'pirate infested seas'. The seventh-century Sri Vijaya 
empire's powerful navy controlled the straits and swept pirates 
away but as the empire weakened the pirates returned.7 Pirates will 
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exist wherever there are no strong state-run navies to patrol and 
apprehend them, and can survive even where there are. Indeed, a 
national navy might seem a pirate to a different nation. When 
the Europeans moved into the East their behaviour often differed 
little from piracy. The Dutch commander, Jan van Coen, in the mid 
seventeenth century bluntly asserted that might made right, a claim 
typical of pirates. 8 
The level of piracy at any given time roughly measures the level 
of the effectiveness of public authority at sea. Even today this is far 
from absolute. Pirates in the South China seas-always a great area 
for piracy-are pillaging and raping the boat people. Pirates around 
Hong Kong are deeply involved in illicit trade which the colonial 
authorities are unable to suppress. That the Roman empire was 
eventually able largely to suppress pirates in the Mediterranean is an 
impressive testimony to Roman power and was only achieved after 
a struggle for (according to Strabo) pirates initially were found in 
great bands in the Mediterranean. Pompey was given special powers 
by the Lex Gabinia to repress piracy. After the fall of Rome, piracy 
resumed.9 Throughout the tenth century in the Mediterranean piracy 
meant coastal raids. It damaged shipping and commerce and led to 
impoverishment of shores. The Byzantine empire fought back, 
reorganising its coastline into themes with local responsibilities which 
succeeded in dislodging pirates and protecting coasts. Piracy was 
checked but not eliminated. Other medieval land empires were even 
less successfuI.l 0 
The seas have always been an ungovernable area. The rulers who 
exercised dominion over the land could rarely claim control over the 
adjoining seas although jurisdiction over a small border of sea-as 
far as the eye could see, an arrows length, a gun shot distance-was 
usually claimed and admitted. Beyond that there was no enforceable 
national law . 
Now there cannot be pirates properly speaking if there is no 
accepted law which includes definitions of property-unless you 
believe in the law of nature or divine law as existing sub specie 
aetemitate. Initially therefore those who went to sea removed 
themselves from the ordinary social contract and protection of the 
state. At sea, might was right. The master of a ship had ultimate 
authority-under God-always supposing he could keep it. Life 
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at sea was often nastier, more brutish and shorter even than life 
on land. Nevertheless some agreed practices about conduct at sea 
which were ultimately enforceable in court on land developed, 
because men would not embark on a perilous undertaking without 
some commitment as to their rights and responsibilities. Some 
forum for the airing and settling of disputes was widely seen as 
necessary. From the very earliest days codes of conduct applicable 
regardless of the nationality of the individual developed and there 
were arrangements which attempted to enforce them. The laws of 
Hammurabi (I8()() B.C.) of Babylon refer to sea causes. Under the 
Romans there was the Rhodian sea law which gave rise to several 
maritime codes. I I The comprehensive Rhodian law which was 
much praised for its equity included rules about partnerShip, joint 
ventures, charter parties and bills of lading. It established the 
commander's liability and the seamen's. It specified the shares to 
which each was entitled and how grievances were to be settled and 
what the seaman had to bring with him. It laid out what passengers 
could do and what rights they had. It specified conditions under 
which a master could be removed and matters over which he had to 
consult. 
The basic rules of the Rhodian sea law were widely copied in the 
Middle Ages although local codes developed particular practices. 
Thus, written customs survive from 1010 for the City of Amalfitina, 
and from 1063 for Trani. Laws from particular places became the 
basis of practice over extensive areas: thus the laws of Oleron became 
the usual rule in the Atlantic and the Laws of Wisby or Lubeck, 
which were published in the fourteenth century under the auspices 
of the Hanse, in the Baltic. Courts for such business, usually called 
Consulates of the Sea, developed in parts of the Mediterranean and 
elsewhere. Under the impetus of national attempts to proclaim 
jurisdiction over the sea, by the seventeenth century the legal minds 
of Grotius and others were developing sea law into a sort of 
international law.12 
There was plenty of room for debate over questions as 
fundamental as who was authorised to engage in the settlement of 
disputes, what were the rules about naval engagements and what 
could be done legally at sea. What constituted an act of war at sea; 
by what power did a nation's navy act on the high seas, and what 
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power did naval ships have in peacekeeping? Who had authority to 
control the conduct of ships on the high seas, and what is the nature 
of collective responsibility?13 
With such issues unclear it is not surprising that the pirate could 
slip through the system and even achieve a level of legitimacy, 
particularly in conditions of war but even in peacetime. The 
distinction between ships authorised by legitimate land powers and 
pirates is infinitely complicated by the fact that no-one owns the 
sea. Where and what is permissible becomes an argument between 
natural justice and the necessities of war. In wartime, for example, 
can warShips blockading a coast interfere with shipping sailing 
inshore or sheltering in neutral waters? Can a prize be taken in such 
waters? In peacetime when warships have the right to sail the seas 
does this legitimise espionage by landing and rescuing agents, and 
other interference in local disputes? 
The distinction between this sort of behaviour undertaken in 
national interests and piracy can be exceedingly narrow. Piracy has 
not invariably been seen as incompatible with the proper authority 
of the state. Pirates might be useful allies for land powers engaged 
in national struggle.14 For a time, they might achieve a level of 
acceptability. Pirates like the Sallee pirates were willing and able to 
enter into virtual treaties with nation states. English privateers, as a 
result of that agreement, were required to give bonds not to harm 
Sallee ships. Some legitimate merchants thought this the most 
economical way to protect their business and protested when in 
1631 after the end of the war Captain John Maddock took a Sallee 
man-of-war and sold her in Cadiz which resulted in a new onslaught 
by Sallee.15 
Piracy can thus shade over into government. In periods of disorder, 
the pirate may well operate a 'protection' business-a percentage 
for a service that the state does not provide. This was generally 
achieved by what was called 'ransom at sea' ---the ship was permitted 
to continue after the payment of a suitable amount. The distinction 
between this and the system of 'cartazas' by which the Portuguese 
tried to keep control of the trade to the East is one of pretended 
legitimisation. States, of which the medieval Italian states are but 
one example, sometimes solved their pirate problems by inviting the 
poacher to become gamekeeper. Pirate fleets overnight became state 
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navies, for pirate fleets were professionals willing to sell their services 
to anyone offering them the right price. 
Piracy is in fact a complex business and must for the most part be 
studied as just that-as a business enterprise. 16 It was treated as a 
trade by Aristotle, the equivalent of any other trade with its own 
hopes and expectations. If one treats it as such, its history becomes 
more intelligible if less colourful. One can, in fact, establish certain 
fundamental criteria which are necessary for the pirate and which 
reveal typical pirates to be quite different from their literary image. 
Destruction is in no way the prime objective. What the pirate seeks 
is the rapid accumulation of wealth which will provide a comfortable 
lifestyle as quickly as possible. The first necessity is therefore a 
reliable market in which he can conveniently dispose of his prizes. 
The goods that the pirate 'liberates' are useless to him without such 
a market. Goods must be saleable but any saleable goods are of 
interest. Gold, sil ver and jewels are highly desirable because of their 
portability, but pirates were as likely to prey on the grain fleets 
which were Rome's essential lifeline, the fishing fleets in the middle 
ages or the Newfoundland fishermen in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, as on the more heavily guarded Spanish treasure fleets of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
A further necessity was a secure base. Pirates who lost their base 
had to find another or disband. The best way to clear a sea of pirates 
was to destroy their base but this was not easily achieved. The 
French sent expeditions in 1629, 1630 and 1635 against Sallee which 
had little effect. A British attempt in January 1637 financed by ship 
money was temporarily successful, but there was insufficient money 
for the continuous patrols necessary to prevent the pirates returning. 
When the buccaneers were driven out of the West Indies in the early 
eighteenth century they moved to Madagascar, where they flourished 
into the mid nineteenth century. Taking the region between Tamatave 
and Diego Suarez on the east coast for their base, they married the 
local girls and settled to a routine of preying on the Indian Ocean 
trade. As Madagascar was a good source of rice and slaves and so a 
stopping off point anyway the local authorities tolerated this 
unorthodox economic activity. One might say that these pirates were 
good family men when at home and this was a fairly widespread 
phenomenon. I7 Piracy was not commonly a matter of outlaws seeking 
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revenge-it could even be a family business, passed down from 
father to son, an acceptable form of making a living. 
To be a pirate you needed a ship and this in itself indicates that 
piracy is a business. Ships require initial capital and suitable ships 
and armaments were not necessarily taken as prizes and could only 
be taken as prizes when the pirate already had a ship. The pirate, 
moreover, needed a constantly improved ship to remain that one 
step ahead oflegal trade. Piracy, ironically, promoted the search for 
better ships. Under threat, legitimate commerce moved to defensible 
ships and larger crews (and so larger ships). Genoa, Pisa, Venice 
and other Italian cities became stronger and more effective at sea 
and developed better ships in the process of rooting out nests of 
pirates. They used big galleys which were becoming lower, wider 
and faster. In northern seas at the same time cogs replaced other 
merchant ships in part because they were less likely to be easy prey 
to pirates since they were defensible. 
Building pirate ships by the sixteenth century was a specialised 
business. Pirates were able to order ships to their specifications 
from shipbuilders and some yards were almost exclusively patronised 
by pirates. For example, Breton corsairs' boats, smaller 'goelettes' 
and 'chasse-man~es' were built at ship yards on the Rance, at St 
Servan and elsewhere; the larger three-masted ships were acquired 
at Lorient at shipyards belonging to the Compagnie des Indes but 
not averse to other orders. I 8 
A further, if unmanageable, necessity was to regulate the business 
so that it could continue. Piracy is parasitical-and so needed to 
ensure that its host did not die. The law of diminishing returns 
limited the amount of piratical infestation that any trade route could 
bear without declining but this was a problem few successfully solved. 
The pirates of Wisby in the seventh century eventually turned to 
legitimate trade because it was more profitable and less hazardous. 
How then did the pirates operate? The seas after all are apparently 
trackless. No ship perhaps ever sails exactly the same route twice 
and out of sight of land it may seem strange that before radar and 
modem instruments ships could ever be intercepted except by chance. 
The winds and currents, however, do make certain routes and certain 
landfalls likely and this is how, why and where merchants fell prey 
to pirates. Particular choke points were always vulnerable points for 
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cargo ships. Pirates concentrated where there was a concentration 
of trade. Piracy flourished when trade flourished. Pirates of all 
nationalities hovered around the straits of Messina in the 
Mediterranean. In the north and north eastern seas, off the coasts of 
Brittany, in the Channel, in the estuaries of the Low countries and 
the opening of the Sound, Scots and English, Aemish, French and 
Spanish, and at times the Barbary rovers, competed and co-operated. 
The Channel Islands provided useful neutral ports. 19 Pirates prospered 
most from unprotected shipping and in periods of disorder. In the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, during the hundred years war and 
the Hanseatic League struggles, disorder in which piracy thrived 
developed. Piracy also benefited from the expansion of maritime 
activity at the time and above all from the effects of exploration and 
the colonisation of the 'New World'. Europeans had no sooner 
discovered the Eastern Pacific than pirates found profitable bases 
there from which to prey on the growing colonial trade. 
Piracy might generally be a business but it could sometimes be a 
form of religiously inspired guerilla warfare. When the Moslems 
were expelled from Spain in 1492 some of them settled at Sallee on 
the Atlantic coast of Morocco. They were not related to the local 
tribes but survived by balancing one side against another in the local 
disorders and factions and became a very successful pirate 
organisation motivated not so much by business as by a desire for 
revenge on the Spanish rulers. They had forty or more ships in the 
early seventeenth century with ten to twenty pieces of artillery, mainly 
light and swift ships which could outrun the heavier and slower 
naval vessels, and which operated in large fleets. In 1625 thirty of 
them were on the coast of Cornwall taking men, up to 1500 it was 
claimed, particularly seamen or fishermen, as male slaves, and forcing 
them to join the pirate crews which often had English masters as 
well as Dutch, Turkish and Moorish.20 
Pirates might reject the authority of nation states but they normally 
acknowledged the authority of some laws and were content to abide 
by them. The basis for these traditional rules was often in fact the 
Rhodian law, modified by generations of use but still providing for 
such things as the participation of the crew in decision making. The 
attraction of piracy to many seamen in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was often just that. The navy offered an increasingly rigid 
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hierarchy and diminishing hope for a share of the prize money; 
piracy offered a greater degree of freedom and an opening for ability. 
The indi vidual's prospects were much better if serving as a pri vateer 
or a pirate than in the regular navy-which usually had to resort to 
the press gang for its crews. There was a much higher chance of 
reward and a much greater sense of participation in the government 
of the enterprise in contrast to the alienating hierarchical punishing 
authoritarianism of the state navies.21 When in 1674 a group of 
pirates established a short-lived state of their own they called in 
Libertalia. 
So far from being unwilling to co-operate, pirates saw advantages 
in both short and long term partnerships. A pirate fleet had a better 
chance of success than a single Ship. In the first quarter of the 
seventeenth century, for instance, the Barbary corsairs became a 
great threat. Instead of operating in small groups of no more than 
three and mainly in the Mediterranean they were moving into larger 
scale operations, partly because Englishmen were beginning to shift 
from their bases in Ireland to Algiers, Tunis and Mamora, and taught 
the local corsairs to use sailing ships and ordnance. 
The pirate fleets operated according to traditional laws which 
bore a general similarity to the rules governing the division of profits 
on a merchant ship or a fiShing boat. The rules about shares were 
well established. Partnerships were the norm. Contracts for thirds 
and loans, either of money or arms, were reimbursed from profits 
and captain and crew reimbursed according to status and merit. 
Shares for other ships who might have assisted in the overall effort 
without actually taking the prize followed well understood practices. 
Pirates frequently operated in small fleets and with a high degree of 
co-operation. Enterprises in piracy were formed in America and 
elsewhere. Agreements between pirates saw the laisser passer of 
one honoured by others. 
Piracy is not an easy trade. Successful pirates need to be clever. 
They have to be daring, quickwitted and better seamen than the 
average merchant captain or naval officer or they will not survive. 
Their boats need to be faster and more manoeuvrable. TIley need the 
latest technological devices. For this reason it is usually assumed 
that they are responsible for a number of the improvements in 
shipbuilding and navigation. It may, for example, have been pirates 
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from Bayonne who introduced the stem rudder to the Mediterranean 
in about 1300.22 
Because of their remarkable exploits the names of some successful 
pirates are remembered down the centuries-the German Klaus 
Stortebeker, the English Henry Pay, Read, Teat, Williams, Avery 
and Kidd, John Hawley, Hankyn Selandoe and Hankyn Lyons, the 
Dutch Claes Gerritz Compaen and Jan Jansz, the French Charles des 
Maretz and Matheolin de Cargaret of Dieppe, the Breton Jean de 
Coetanlem and Jean Pelisson, the Dane Paul Beneke and the 
Americans Tew, Burgess and Halsey. Many early explorers like 
Magellan and others were really involved in piratical or privateering 
operations.23 Vasco da Gama and d' Albuquerque should really be 
remembered as much for their piracy as for their contribution to 
empire building. 
The image of ruthlessness, however, has been deliberately fostered 
as part of the pirate's resources. Fear is a potent weapon. In the 
period between 1660 and 1720 when the buccaneers and freebooters 
flourished and from which period modem piratical images mainly 
stem, men like Blackbeard fostered a reputation for indestructibility 
and created a myth with diabolic parallels-men whose hair gave 
off flame and smoke, men untouchable by bullets; men, and 
occasionally women, without pity or morals, people with a lust for 
ill-gotten treasure.24 Defoe was one of the later, if undeniably the 
best known, of those who retailed such stories to a credulous audience 
with an insatiable appetite for thrills.25 
If it was a business like any other, piracy was not one which 
added any value to the industry, agriculture and commerce on which 
it preyed. What it did was redistribute resources, sometimes at less 
than cost. Certainly most goods seized were not lost to the world 
economy but producing a proper macro level balance sheet is 
impossible. Mollat concludes that piracy was a constant brake on 
the development of trade. Andrews saw privateering at the end of 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as the foundation of 
the English empire. 
Neither costs, prices nor spin-off benefits, in fact, can be 
adequately quantified. Prize goods passed into the unknowable black 
market of trade. Demand for certain products was such that customers 
asked no questions if the price was right, and that price cannot be 
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ascertained. While piracy advantaged some, it disadvantaged more. 
As the Channel Islander Philip Falle said 'Prlvateering '" tho gainful 
to some particular persons could not make us amends for the loss of 
peaceable open trade the benefit whereof is more general and 
diffusive' .26 Privateering was an alternative form of commerce for 
merchants in time of war but not the preferred form. The costs of 
arming or protecting ships by convoys, moreover, put up the price 
of goods and reduced the volume of sales-although it stimulated 
some forms of industry. Insurance in the Mediterranean ran at a 
15% on cost level added to prices. Fraud and compliCity confuse the 
picture. 
On the positive side must be placed the pirates' level of daring 
and initiative; the part they played in opening up new routes and 
exploration; their contribution to the development of better ships 
and navigational instruments. But they remained parasites; and if 
they multiplied too much regular merchant trade dried up. 
Piracy/privateering as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
progressed became an increasingly problematic element in the sea-
borne relationships of nations. The lack of control exercised by 
land-based authorities which had once been a useful excuse was 
becoming a sign of weakness. The well known 'privateering' voyage 
of Kenelm Digby to Scanderoon (in NE Mediterranean) in 1626 was 
the sort of enterprise which raised difficult issues of maritime law 
and caused great international friction without the national benefits 
which had been envisaged. It helped to push the countries of Europe 
to favour permanent navies over private venturers whose behaviour 
could be neither predicted nor controlled. Digby was supposed to be 
taking French prizes but his exploits only illustrate how uncertain 
privateering undertakings could be for both country and individual, 
even when they were apparently successful. Digby made little 
distinction between piracy and privateering. Starting with two ships 
with 26 guns apiece, he stayed in Algiers while his crew recovered 
their health; took several prizes in the western Mediterranean 
including a 250 ton French flyboat which he made his rear-admiral; 
and refitted and found new boats in Zante and Cephalonia, where he 
sold some of the prize goods and vessels despite the resentment of 
the Venetians. With a fleet now augmented to five, he won a hollow 
victory at Scanderoon as, with Venetian help, the French were able 
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to get most of their goods ashore. His behaviour caused a diplomatic 
incident and reprisals against the English Levant company which 
disrupted English legal trade. On the way home he took two prizes, 
one a Hamburg ship and the other Ragusan, both neutral shipping 
but which he claimed were laden with Spanish goods. The English 
admiralty court accepted this probably unjustified plea despite 
widespread European objections raised particularly by the Venetians. 
The voyage was thus technically profitable, but the opprobrium and 
retaliation which it engendered lasted longer than any profits. In 
Charles I's five years of warfare at least 737 prizes valued at 
£800,000-900,000 were adjudged lawful by the English admiralty 
court. This may have outweighed the country's losses to hostile 
privateers but whether or not it outbalanced trade foregone may be 
doubtful. Notarial accounts in the Mediterranean and the letters of 
marque give some hints of the percentage of trade lost to pirates. 
Tenenti reckoned over a quarter of all shipping was lost to pirates 
between 1560 and 1615.27 Losses in the Atlantic were equally high. 
A leading maritime nation like Portugal lost over 300 ships in the 
reign of John III alone.28 
Ultimately, if trade was to expand unhindered, state governments 
had either to develop and finance ever larger navies in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries-to protect the income which they derived 
from duties on merchant goods--or to recognise pirates as the rulers 
of the sea. The burden of tax required to support state navies may 
not have been less onerous than the pirates' protection money but it 
was more regular and organised and its incidence more equitable. 
The institution which developed perhaps also provided spin-offs in 
the form of public exploration, mapping, technological testing of 
improved navigational aids and a service in times of distress. Even 
so, piracy has not wholly disappeared and could always reappear in 
force if national naval power diminishes. 
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